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Au cours des années 1940, le gouvernement fédéral entreprit des projets visant à
déménager dans des établissements centralisés les membres des Premières nations
des Maritimes qui vivaient dans de petites réserves. À compter de 1945, les Malécites
du Nouveau-Brunswick furent ciblés par la centralisation, alors qu’Ottawa planifiait
de relocaliser les habitants des réserves de St. Mary’s, de Woodstock et d’Oromocto
à Kingsclear, au nord-ouest de Fredericton. Toutefois, la centralisation au Nouveau-
Brunswick échoua en raison, dans une large mesure, des actions menées par les
Malécites. En dénonçant publiquement la centralisation, en remettant des pétitions
aux représentants du gouvernement fédéral et en formant un nouveau collectif
politique des Malécites de la vallée du fleuve Saint-Jean, les Malécites firent échec au
plan de centralisation d’Ottawa au Nouveau-Brunswick.
In the 1940s the federal government undertook schemes to relocate Native people in
the Maritimes from smaller reserves to centralized settlements. Beginning in 1945
New Brunswick’s Maliseet were targeted with centralization, as Ottawa planned to
relocate the people of the St. Mary’s, Woodstock, and Oromocto reserves to
Kingsclear, northwest of Fredericton. New Brunswick centralization, however, failed
in large part due to the actions of the Maliseet. By denouncing centralization publicly,
by petitioning federal officials, and by reconstituting a Saint John River Valley
Maliseet political collective, the Maliseet successfully stymied Ottawa’s New
Brunswick centralization plan.
DURING THE 1940s CANADA’S FEDERAL GOVERNMENT undertook schemes
to “centralize” Native people in each of the three Maritime provinces. Grounded in
Ottawa’s quest for economical Indian Affairs administration as well as public
pressure, Maritime centralization plans also emerged from a mid-20th-century
impulse to raise the standards of living in impoverished communities to levels deemed
appropriate to a “modern” Canada. The Maliseet of New Brunswick’s Saint John
River Valley were one target of these centralization initiatives. Beginning in 1945,
federal officials advocated that people in three Maliseet communities in the lower
Saint John River Valley be relocated to an existing reserve at Kingsclear, ten
kilometres northwest of Fredericton. A study of Ottawa’s New Brunswick
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centralization plan demonstrates the extent to which the federal government believed
itself to be both entitled to and justified in dictating what happened in terms of the
lives of these Maliseet and the land on which they lived. Strong Maliseet opposition
to the scheme, however, demonstrates the limits of state power as, in the face of
federal machinations, the Maliseet, with some assistance from non-Native supporters,
mobilized against centralization. That centralization did not happen in New
Brunswick was the result of this opposition.
An analysis of Maliseet opposition to centralization between 1945, when the plan
was first proposed, and 1949, when talk of the plan waned, offers an important
addition to what is a sparse (but growing) historiography concerning 20th-century
Maliseet-state relations.1 It also serves as a corrective to a prevailing
misunderstanding about eastern Canadian Native political activity during this same
era. In Canadian scholarship, there has been a tendency to ignore 20th-century Native
political action as it existed at the community level and to herald pan-Indian
movements in the 1930s and 1940s, such as the North American Indian Brotherhood
(NAIB), as the “birth” of Native political action.2 Despite the existence of numerous
studies highlighting the myriad ways in which Native people at the local level resisted
the imposition of federal policy (which often had important political results), this
focus on pan-Indian political organizations as the measure of Native political activism
has reinforced the notion that Native people were, in their day-to-day lives, politically
inactive.3 Scholars’ treatment of this so-called “birth”of Native politics has not only
Acadiensis4
1 Tellingly, the index of E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise’s edited collection, The Atlantic Provinces in
Confederation (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1993) – the standard university text – has no entry for
“Maliseet.” The same is true of J.R. Miller’s important survey of Native-White relations in Canada –
Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2000). Other key texts also give the Maliseet short shrift. Olive
Dickason’s Canada’s First Nations: A History of the Founding Peoples from Earliest Times (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1992) and Arthur J. Ray’s I Have Lived Here Since the World Began: An
Illustrated History of Canada’s Native People (Toronto: Lester Publishing and Key Porter Books,
1996) both limit their considerations of the Maliseet to the pre-Confederation era, saying nothing
about their history in the 20th century. There are, however, exceptions to this dearth: Robert John
Cloney, “Doctor, Lawyer, Indian Chief . . . : Dependency among the Maliseet and the Impact of the
Indian Act” (master’s thesis, Saint Mary’s University, 1993); Bill Parenteau, “Care, Control and
Supervision: Native People in the Canadian Atlantic Salmon Fishery, 1867-1900,” Canadian
Historical Review, 79, 1 (March 1998), pp. 1-35; Bill Parenteau and James Kenny, “Survival,
Resistance, and the Canadian State: The Transformation of New Brunswick’s Native Economy, 1867-
1930, ” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, 12 (2002), pp. 49-71; and Ken Coates, The
Marshall Decision and Native Rights (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000).
Appreciation is extended to Jean Dragon for her permission to use the archives of her grandfather,
Edwin Tappan Adney. Thanks as well to colleagues who commented on an earlier version of this
paper: “‘There was and still is much to say’: The Maliseet and the Special Joint Committee, 1946-48”
(presented to the Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, Fredericton, May 2005).
2 See J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, p. 318. The chapter entitled “The Beginnings of
Political Organization” (pp. 311-35) in this survey text features Native political organizations that
emerged in the interwar period.
3 Several examples demonstrate this widespread and more local resistance. Paul Tennant, in Aboriginal
Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia, 1990), notes that although the British Columbian rise of “big
province-wide Indian organizations” in the 1960s and 1970s revitalized the quest for land claims, this
era was not the genesis of this fight as Native political leaders on the British Columbian coast had
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obscured the continuity in Native politics generally, but it has particularly failed the
history of eastern Canadian Native people by errantly casting these 20th-century
political organizations as solely western Canadian movements.4 Written out of these
emergent groups, the political activism and successes of eastern Native people,
including the Maliseet, have been ignored. As this article illustrates, the Maliseet were
politically active in the 1940s and their actions were far from ineffective and
inconsequential; they directly influenced the federal government’s decision to
suspend its New Brunswick centralization plan.
In 1945 New Brunswick’s Mi’kmaq and Maliseet, like all Native people in
Canada, were administered by the Indian Affairs Branch (IAB) of the federal
Department of Mines and Resources.5 New Brunswick had three Indian agencies: the
Northeastern agency based at Rexton, the Northern, centred at Perth, and the
Southwestern, at Fredericton. Each was headed by a full-time Indian agent.
Accountable to Ottawa and not the Native people they administered, Indian agents
monitored and reported on virtually all facets of Native life. Agents’ reach into
communities was extensive; they supervised schooling and band governance, co-
ordinated health care services and economic initiatives, and acted as “moral
watchdogs” by enforcing temperance.6 The Maliseet lived on six New Brunswick
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been “constantly” involved since 1849 in resisting federal policy that denied them land title
recognition (pp. ix-xiii). Similarly, historian Douglas Harris in Fish, Law and Colonialism: The Legal
Capture of Salmon in British Columbia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) explores how
Native British Columbian fishers used resistence to political ends to minimize, delay, and avoid the
imposition of the federal fishing rules. Likewise, Katherine Pettipas’s Severing the Ties that Bind:
Government Repression of Indigenous Religious Ceremonies on the Prairies (Winnipeg: University
of Manitoba Press, 1994) explores how western Natives, when faced with a federal ban on their
ceremonial dances, defied federal policy by continuing to hold these ceremonies either clandestinely
or publicly (as part of non-Native exhibitions). Mary-Ellen Kelm’s Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal
Health and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-1950 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1998) demonstrates
how Native people resisted state efforts to impose modern “scientific” healthcare on Native
communities through their continued adherence to traditional healing practices. Finally, with regard
to the Maliseet, Bill Parenteau and Jim Kenny’s “Survival, Resistance, and the Canadian State”
explores the ways in which New Brunswick Native people actively resisted both the usurpation of
their lands and harsh game and resource laws. Collectively, these studies show that Native people
(including the Maliseet) wielded political clout outside of formal organizations through everyday
actions.
4 For example, in his Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens and in his more recent Lethal Legacy: Current
Native Controversies in Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2004), p. 79, J.R. Miller stresses
the westward orientation of interwar political organizations. He characterizes the North American
Indian Brotherhood, for instance, as “primarily a British Columbia organization” and does not
acknowledge that the Mi’kmaq were founding members who inaugurated a Nova Scotia arm of the
organization at the time of national movement’s inception. Regional works have also disregarded
eastern Natives’ political activities in the 1940s. Ken Coates, for example, errantly asserts that “the
Maritimes were [sic] the last region in the country to develop Aboriginal organizations, for the first
ones did not appear until the 1960s.” See Coates, The Marshall Decision and Native Rights, p. 49.
5 Over the years, Indian Affairs had several administrative homes within the federal government. In
1880, Indian Affairs became its own federal department, a status it maintained until 1936. Between
1936 and 1949, Indian Affairs was a branch of the Department of Mines and Resources and, in 1950,
it was transferred to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.
6 For more on reserve administration, see Cloney, “Doctor, lawyer, Indian Chief. . .” as well as the
annual reports of the federal department of Indian Affairs. Until 1916 these reports were quite detailed
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reserves in 1945.7 Because the IAB did not record the populations of individual
reserves, and because not all Maliseet lived on reserves, it is impossible to determine
with certainty the distribution of New Brunswick’s Maliseet. However, the most
populous reserve was Tobique; its approximately 450 residents equaled the Maliseet
population from the other five reserves combined.8 The ample and sparsely settled
Kingsclear reserve was slated to become a centralized hub of Maliseet settlement.
Located on the shores of the Saint John River, Kingsclear had long been a Maliseet
camping and fishing place and had, since 1792, been designated as a reserve.
In relocating some Maliseet to this site, the centralization programme promised to
halve the number of Maliseet reserves in the province. Of the six Maliseet reserves in
New Brunswick, three – Oromocto, St. Mary’s (Devon), and Woodstock – were slated
for relocation. All three were situated on the immediate outskirts of non-Native
municipalities. The federal government first purchased 200 acres at Woodstock in
1851.9 At St. Mary’s a small grant of 2.5 acres was allotted in 1867 and an additional
328.5 acres were added in 1928. Oromocto became a federally recognized reserve of
125 acres in 1895.10 The history of these and other reserved lands suggests that
interference in Maliseet land was not a new phenomenon in 1945 and that the Maliseet
of New Brunswick were all-too-accustomed to the unjust expropriation of reserve
land. Historian L.F.S. Upton has shown that before Confederation squatting was an
endemic problem to which all three Maritime governments turned blind eyes despite
Native people’s protests and petitions.11 Indeed, New Brunswick’s colonial
government was known to facilitate the appropriation of Native land.12 The scope of
expropriation in New Brunswick is conveyed in the numbers – in 1810, 110,000 acres
of reserved land was designated in New Brunswick for Native people but, by 1927,
the total acreage had shrunk to 37,000 acres. The experience of the residents of the
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and contained a report from each agency. From 1917 on, individual agencies’ reports 
were not included and provincial summaries were offered instead. These annual reports are 
now available online and are searchable by keyword and date at
http://www.collectionscanada.ca/indianaffairs/index-e.html. By 1945, 2,047 Native people were
subject to the watchful eyes of New Brunswick Indian agents. Although the Maliseet were not
counted as a distinct group, they comprised approximately half of this entire Native population. See
Canada, Department of Mines and Resources, “Report of Indian Affairs Branch for the Fiscal Year
Ended March 31, 1946,” p. 224.
7 The Maliseet reserves were: Tobique, Kingsclear, Madawaska (St. Basile), Oromocto, St. Mary’s, and
Woodstock.
8 Richard H. Bartlett, Indian Reserves in the Atlantic Provinces of Canada, Studies in Aboriginal
Rights, no. 9 (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1986), pp. 19-20. Edwin
Tappan Adney makes this point in his notes. See E. Tappan Adney Fonds, case 4, file 8, number 9,
University of New Brunswick – Archives and Special Collections (UNBASC). In 1946 solicitor H.
H..Gunter noted that the Oromocto reserve was home to 21 families. See H.H. Gunter to Hon. H.
Francis G. Bridges, 29 October 1946, RG 10, vol. 7760, file 27056-2, part 1, Library and Archives
Canada (LAC).
9 Bartlett, Indian Reserves in the Atlantic Provinces of Canada, p. 17.
10 Vincent O. Erickson, “Maliseet-Passamaquoddy,” in Bruce Trigger, ed., Handbook of North
American Indians, Volume 15: The North East (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), p. 125.
11 L.F.S. Upton, Micmacs and Colonists: Indian-White Relations in the Maritimes, 1713-1867
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1979).
12 For example, in 1838 the New Brunswick government dispossessed the Mi’kmaq of Kent County of
their land. See Upton, Micmacs and Colonists, p. 100.
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Woodstock reserve underscores this legacy of shady land dealings. The 1851 purchase
of the Woodstock reserve land was necessitated by illegal squatting on another nearby
tract of reserved land. As was typical, the New Brunswick government chose in 1851
not to dislodge the illegal squatters but rather to purchase a smaller tract of land closer
to the town of Woodstock. The sale agreement acknowledged this circumstance,
explaining that the new Woodstock reserve was for “Public uses: that is to say, for the
use of the Melicette Tribe of Indians at the Meductic . . . in Lieu of a Tract of land of
which the said Indians have been wrongfully deprived as is alleged.”13
Like the custom of usurping Native land, the pattern of settling Native people at
limited, specially selected sites was longstanding. Although the practice of
centralizing Native people was more common in western Canada, where Ottawa
administered larger Native populations, the idea of centralizing Native people had for
decades been part of New Brunswick’s Indian policy.14 In 1840, more than a century
before the 1945 centralization plan was proposed, Moses Perley, the man charged
with New Brunswick’s colonial Indian Affairs, proposed a “civilization” program that
would have seen the colony’s Maliseet moved to Kingsclear where, under the tutelage
of a superintendent, adults would be taught to farm and children encouraged to attend
public schools. The scheme, he proposed, would be funded by the sale of vacated
reserve land.15
Perley’s 1840 centralization plan did not materialize, but later schemes did. In
1897, the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) – the federal department then in charge
of matters pertaining to Indians – considered relocating the Maliseet living at the
Woodstock reserve. In September, DIA secretary J.D. McLean asked Fredericton
Indian Agent James Farrell for information about the Woodstock reserve. Proposing
that the people there be moved to the reserve further upriver at Tobique, McLean
asked if it would be in the Maliseet’s “interest that the [Woodstock] Reserve should
be disposed of” and, if so, “would they give surrender for that purpose?”16 Agent
Farrell responded that the eight families (40 people) who called the Woodstock
reserve home were poor but “quiet and harmless.” He also predicted that they would
be unwilling to surrender their land and move, noting that “when Indians live for an
age in any locality they have their friends and acquaintances with whom they trade.”17
Farrell’s response convinced McLean that, given the community’s small size and
disinterest in leaving, it was “not considered advisable to interfere with these Indians
or make any disposition of their Reserve.”18 For the time being, the Woodstock
Maliseet and their land were spared federal interference.
Subsequent proposals for Maliseet relocation were, however, put to Ottawa. In
Maliseet Resistance to Relocation 7
13 Bartlett, Indian Reserves in the Atlantic Provinces of Canada, pp. 17-20.
14 To refer to New Brunswick policies before Confederation toward the Native people within its borders
as “Indian policy” is something of a misnomer as the colony altogether lacked both a consistent policy
and a department charged with Indian administration. Government “policy” was decidedly ad hoc,
sporadic, and almost entirely confined to the occasional granting of modest relief. See Upton,
Micmacs and Colonists, p. 101.
15 Upton, Micmacs and Colonists, p. 105.
16 J.D. McLean to James Farrell, 7 September 1897, RG 10, vol. 7760, file 27056-5, LAC.
17 James Farrell to J.D. McLean, 9 September 1897, RG 10, vol. 7760, file 27056-5, LAC.
18 J.D. McLean to A.R. Colter, 14 September 1897, RG 10, vol. 7760, file 27056-5, LAC.
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1910 Father F.C. Ryan, a priest serving the Maliseet at Tobique, recommended to the
DIA that the Maliseet of the province be centralized at the Tobique reserve. He argued
that “to my mind justice can only be done the Indians in gathering them together at
least the different bands of the one tribe on a good Reservation. The Gov[ernmen]t
will then be better able to concentrate all their energy to one instead of different
Reservations.” Father Ryan continued:
The Millicette Tribe is scattered all over the Western part of the
Prov[ince] of NB and parts of the state of Maine. Now if the
Gov[ernment] could bring St Mary’s, Oromocto, Edmundston,
Tobique and other bands of the same Tribe together on one
Reservation, and erect a large convent school (since all the Indians
here are Catholics), a work house, [i]ntroduce manual training, erect
a jail, provide them with a magistrate, post office police force etc.
[then] . . . the Gov[ernment] will be working on a sure basis for the
advancement of the Indians.19
Interestingly, however, Ryan’s 1910 centralization plan was dismissed by federal
officials as being an action “more drastic than the Government would be inclined to
entertain” and one that would “involve restriction of the liberty of the Indians to a
degree that has not yet formed any part of the Policy of the Government.”20
By 1929, however, the time was apparently right for such a “restriction of liberty.”
During that year, the DIA decided to relocate the Maliseet community of St. Mary’s from
the shores of the St. John River in Fredericton to an inland site near North Devon, on the
outskirts of the provincial capital. The relocation of the so-called “St. Mary’s Indians”
was a decades-long process. It was initiated in the early 1900s at the behest of non-Native
Frederictonians who opposed the presence of the Maliseet “parading the streets of
Fredericton” and who also favoured acquiring for the city the riverside “recreational”
land that the Native people occupied.21 In 1918 the mayor of Fredericton, R.B. Hanson,
advocated the relocation of St. Mary’s, explaining that “the Reserve is in the heart of the
town and is an impediment to the progress of the Town. It is not a desirable location for
an Indian Reserve, as it is not sufficiently removed from certain evil interests surrounding
it. In addition to that, the Reserve is more or less untidy and uncleanly, and is in fact an
eye sore.”22 For its part, the DIA justified the removal by arguing that the crowded
conditions, “poor sanitation,” and ill-health of the Maliseet community could only be
rectified through relocation.23 By this time, the DIA had legislative support in the form
of a 1911 Indian Act amendment that enabled municipalities to expropriate reserve land
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19 F.C. Ryan, Pastor for Tobique, to Hon. Mr. Oliver, 19 November 1910, RG 10, vol. 3163, file
373,757, LAC.
20 DIA to F.C. Ryan, 26 November 1910, RG 10, vol. 3163, file 373,757, LAC.
21 H.F. McLeod, MP, to D.C. Scott, 7 March 1919, RG 10, vol. 1945, file 4252, part 2, LAC; Joseph
Ryan, Superintendent Indian Schools, to J.D. McLean, 17 May 1911, RG 10, vol. 1945, file 4252, part
2, LAC.
22 Mayor R.B. Hanson to Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 4 December 1918, RG 10, vol. 1945, file
4252, part 2, LAC.
23 Memorandum on “Indian Settlement in Town of Devon, York Co.,” George C. Melvin, Chief Medical
Officer, to D.C. Scott, 16 September 1919, RG 10, vol. 1945, file 4252, part 2, LAC.
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for public purposes.24 For a time, the Kingsclear reserve was part of the St. Mary’s
relocation plan. In 1918 DIA Deputy Superintendent General Duncan Campbell Scott
advised Fredericton Indian Agent B.J. Griffiths to ascertain the feasibility of moving the
St. Mary’s Maliseet to Kingsclear.25 This plan was scuttled in the face of opposition from
people at the St. Mary’s reserve. At a meeting held in the community in February of
1919, residents “emphatically refused to consider going to Kingsclear under any
circumstances” and argued their case on several grounds – grounds that would be restated
in 1945. The residents contended that they and the Maliseet living at Kingsclear were not
on good terms and that discord would result from their relocation.26 They also argued that
Kingsclear’s isolation from non-Native settlements would make it difficult for men to
find employment and noted that the softwood stands of Kingsclear would provide an
inadequate source of fuel.27 Later that month, 32 people from St. Mary’s petitioned
Ottawa, repeating their refusal to relocate while adding to their earlier reasons for
opposition to relocation their belief that coerced relocation was illegal and constituted a
breech of their treaty rights.28 Despite such opposition, St. Mary’s was, nevertheless,
removed a decade later to land outside Devon town limits. This move had no more
support among the Maliseet than had the earlier proposals; residents were upset as much
by the location of their new settlement as they were at having to leave their old one. In a
petition to the DIA, the St. Mary’s community insisted that another new reserve be
created, this time “on the bank of the St. John River” where they would have access to
the fish and the transportation system the river provided.29 Undoubtedly, the much-
opposed St. Mary’s relocation was fresh in the minds of the Maliseet when the federal
government showed renewed interest in relocation in the post-war period.
Despite these relocation antecedents, the 1940s, more than any other decade, can
be considered the era of relocation for Maritime Native people. The plan to create a
centralized reserve at Kingsclear was just one of three planned relocation schemes for
the Maritime provinces, all of which ultimately failed. Prior to the Kingsclear
relocation plan, an Order in Council of 2 April 1942 authorized Ottawa to relocate
Mi’kmaq living on Prince Edward Island to a single provincial reserve at Lennox
Island and to move Nova Scotian Mi’kmaq to one of two sites: Shubenacadie on the
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24 John Leslie and Ron Maguire, eds., The Historical Development of the Indian Act (Ottawa: Treaties
and Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1978), p. 108.
25 D.C. Scott to B.J. Griffiths, 20 November 1918, RG 10, vol. 1945, file 4252, part 2, LAC.
26 The reason for this alleged discord is unclear. It may, however, have been connected with a dispute
over band elections that stretched back to June of 1905. For a time the two communities shared a
chief, and this was apparently a source of discord as each community wanted to be home to the chief.
See Petition of St. Mary’s to DIA, June 1905, vol. 7935, file 32-56, part 1, LAC.
27 J.D. Chene to D.C. Scott, 5 February 1919, RG 10, vol. 1945, file 4252, part 2, LAC.
28 Petition of St. Mary’s to DIA, 16 February 1919, RG 10, vol. 1945, file 4252, part 2, LAC.
29 Petition of St. Mary’s to DIA, 2 January 1927, RG 10, vol. 1945, file 4252-1A, LAC. North Devon
townspeople likewise opposed the new site and also petitioned the department, stating in part: “We
the residents of North Devon, living above the CPR station protest having the Indians taken from their
native (river) environment where sanitation with very little expense is easily available, and being
located ‘on the hill’ where there is pasture land and rocky ledge causing [sic] the sanitary drainage
from bathrooms etc almost impossible.” Not entirely preoccupied with the well-being of the Maliseet,
the citizens of North Devon also feared property devaluation and the “considerable unhappiness and
annoyance” they believed their new neighbours might bring. See Residents of North Devon to Indian
Relief Dept, Gov’t of Canada, 5 June 1929, RG 10, vol. 1945, file 4252-1A, LAC.
19824-01 Walls Article:Walls article  2/26/08  7:23 AM  Page 9
mainland and Eskasoni on Cape Breton Island.30 The federal rationale in all three
Maritime relocation plans was similar. The Indian Aaffairs Branch asserted that
centralized communities would be more efficient and would facilitate greater Native
self-sufficiency. Cost was also a major consideration. While economy had always
been a hallmark of Canada’s Indian administration, increased wartime expenses
strengthened Ottawa’s desire to reduce IAB costs. Branch officials believed that there
was clearly room for fiscal improvement in the Maritimes, where the per capita
spending on Indian Affairs eclipsed the national average. In 1939, following what
amounted to two full decades of recession in the Maritimes, the annual cost of
administering Indian Affairs stood at $34.51 per capita in Nova Scotia, $37.26 on
Prince Edward Island, and $35.46 in New Brunswick, compared to a national per
capita average of $8.70.31 The fact that Native populations were on the rise – in New
Brunswick the Native population had grown by 18 per cent between 1935 and 1945 –
added to the desire of Indian Affairs officials to cut per capita costs.32 Less openly
enunciated by federal officials, but clearly a factor in these wartime centralization
plans, were the petitions of non-Native Maritimers who wanted Native people
removed from the vicinities of their towns. In Nova Scotia, for example, this impetus
was palpable, and both Lisa Patterson and Mi’kmaw historian Daniel Paul assert that
non-Native insistence fueled IAB centralization plans.33
Maritime centralization plans, however, were borne of more that just a long-
standing IAB commitment to cost-cutting or a nod to public pressure. By the mid-
1940s, in the wake of the Great Depression and the Second World War, Canadian
governments at all levels faced immense pressure to increase Canadians’ standards of
living, particularly for those groups who were perceived to have been previously
neglected by state-funded “modernization.” Such communities, lacking employment
opportunities and what had come to be considered basic amenities such as electricity,
sewerage, and other municipal services, were earmarked for state intervention. The
relocation of whole communities became a favoured means of “modernizing” them.
Native communities were among these, but they were not the only ones. The year
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30 J.E. Daly, Quarterly Report Ending March 1945, PEI Indian Agency, RG 10, vol. 6486, file 42057-3,
part 3, LAC; Lisa Lynne Patterson, “Indian Affairs and the Nova Scotia Centralization Policy”
(master’s thesis, Dalhousie University, 1985), p. 56.
31 Patterson, “Indian Affairs and the Nova Scotia Centralization Policy,” pp. 44-6.
32 According to DIA annual reports, the New Brunswick Native population was 1,734 in 1936 and 2,047
in 1946. These figures are probably underestimated. As James C. Saku has pointed out, the values,
assumptions, and biases that determined what data was collected reflected the priorities of Euro-
Canadians and not those of the Native people being counted. See James C. Saku, “Aboriginal Census
Data in Canada: A Research Note,” The Canadian Journal of Native Studies, 19, 2 (1999), pp. 365-
79. Bill Parenteau and James Kenny note that DIA reports give no indication of the data collection
methods used by agents or whether certain methods were used consistently over time. The census-
taking of Indian agents indeed, leaves a “variety of other unanswered questions.” For example, the
time of year in which agricultural and livestock data were gathered is extremely important, and yet
agent reports do not disclose this information. See Bill Parenteau and James Kenny, “Survival,
Resistance, and the Canadian State,” p. 54 (n.14).
33 Patterson, “Indian Affairs and the Nova Scotia Centralization Policy,” p. 63; Daniel Paul, “The
Failure of Centralization,” in Ken S. Coates and Robin Fisher, eds., Out of the Background: Readings
on Canadian Native History, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1996), pp. 340-1.
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1945, for example, also marked the first stirring of interest in relocating the neglected
African-Canadian community at Africville, which was along Halifax’s Bedford
Basin.34 Similarly, Toronto’s Regent Park public housing initiative was also born in
the mid-1940s.35 In the case of the attempted centralizations of the Mi’kmaq and
Maliseet, these “benevolent” aims of relocation meshed nicely with both the
parsimony that had always been part of Indian policy and the longstanding practice of
ousting Maritime Native people from their land.
By late 1945, as the Nova Scotian and Prince Edward Island centralization plans
were underway, the IAB was calling for a similar centralization plan for New
Brunswick. That December, Agency Inspector, Maritimes and Quebec, R.A. Hoey
had advocated the centralization of the lower Saint John River Valley Maliseet to the
Kingsclear reserve. Earlier that autumn, after touring New Brunswick’s Maliseet
reserves, Hoey had advanced this plan in an official report. At that time, Kingsclear
was home to 11 families and had a population of 60 people.36 Hoey lauded the
centralization potential of the small community, which had been a federal reserve
since Confederation.37 He wrote that he had found it “a real pleasure to inspect the
clean, well-furnished homes on this reserve.” The Kingsclear habitations, he noted,
were “occupied by healthy, industrious, and happy people” who “live and behave just
as well as any white people.” Offering what he believed to be evidence of the
necessity of relocation, he also described as deplorable the living conditions
prevailing at Oromocto, Woodstock, and St. Mary’s in Devon. These reserves, he
insisted, featured “many poorly furnished, neglected, untidy, Indian houses.”38
Hoey felt that the Kingsclear site was not just the home of healthy, tidy, and happy
people but that it had additional qualities to recommend it as a hub of centralization. The
community had a Catholic church, river frontage, and was part of the province’s rural
mail delivery service. Perhaps most importantly, the reserve, at that time occupying an
area of 460 acres, had growth potential.39 C.C. Murray, an elderly farmer who owned an
estimated 500 acres abutting the reserve, had expressed interest in selling his land to the
IAB, which was pleased at the prospect of doubling the size of the Kingsclear reserve.
Morris was also impressed with the type of land Murray was offering, as nearly 100
acres of it was cleared, fertile farm land. He reported that the acquisition of Murray’s
farm “would provide sufficient agricultural land to grow vegetables for the needs of all
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the Indians as well as enabling them to augment their incomes by selling surplus garden
products. Fruit trees and small fruits could be planted. There would be ample pasture for
the grazing of goats and cattle to provide milk.”40
The land’s agricultural potential was an attractive prospect to an IAB that had long
been committed to transforming Native people into farmers, both as a means of
encouraging them to assimilate to a Euro-Canadian way of life and as a way to foster
economic self-sufficiency and reduce federal costs.41 The Murray property also had
woodland, which promised to provide the Maliseet much-needed fuel and supplies for
basket-making. Finally, the property was promising as a staging site for federal
administrative offices. The farm had a series of barns and a house equipped with running
water, indoor plumbing, electricity, and a telephone line – advantages not to be
overlooked in New Brunswick during the 1940s. Hoey explained that the house could
serve as both an office for agency administration and as living quarters for a resident
agent and nurses.42 Meanwhile, the barns could act as a warehouse for storing items
required by the agency. With these considerations in mind, Hoey declared: “It is my
opinion that a centralization program for the Indians of the Saint John River Valley
should be undertaken.” He affirmed that there was “no doubt in [his] mind that if this
project is approved it would give the Indians of this Agency an opportunity to improve
their standard of living.” Hoey confidently concluded his report on Kingsclear with the
assertion “I do not feel that there would be much difficulty in obtaining the whole-
hearted co-operation of the Indians in support of a centralization project.”43
Hoey could not have been more wrong. From the outset, Maliseet throughout the
lower Saint John River Valley adamantly opposed the planned centralization scheme
and they mobilized in the face of the threatened relocation to Kingsclear to make clear
their opposition to the plan. Three chiefs in particular led the fight against
centralization: Oromocto’s John S. Paul, Tobique’s William Saulis, and Woodstock’s
Oliver Polchies. The Maliseet opposed centralization in three ways. First, using what
can best be described as a public relations campaign, they denounced the plan and
sought the support of non-Native New Brunswickers. Second, they conveyed their
opposition directly to officials in Ottawa. Third, they launched an anti-centralization
campaign within their own communities, reconstituting a Saint John River Valley
collective that they called the Wulastook (or Wulustuk) Tribe.44 Using these tactics, the
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Maliseet ultimately succeeded in stymying Ottawa’s planned centralization.
The Maliseet fought centralization using an elaborate public relations campaign from
which they garnered much support among non-Native New Brunswickers. The Maliseet
cause was taken up by some prominent New Brunswickers, particularly Native-rights
advocate Edwin Tappan Adney. By the 1940s Tappan Adney was a retiree living in
Woodstock with his wife Minnie Bell Sharp.45 An amateur anthropologist of no mean
ability, Tappan Adney was much interested in Maliseet culture and regularly visited
local reserves, barraging the Maliseet with questions about their history and culture.
Indeed, this was the topic of a series of letters exchanged between Tappan Adney and
noted anthropologist Frank Speck. Tappan Adney was also keenly interested in the
Maliseet’s treatment by the federal government and he supported Maliseet political
aspirations, particularly their fight with Ottawa over centralization. Tappan Adney was,
in his own words, “determined to fight the iniquitous attempt by the Indian Affairs under
the . . . scheme of Centralization to tear the Indians of the three lower river reserves from
their homes for resettlement at Kingsclear” using “a campaign of full and wide
publicity.”46 Tappan Adney conveyed his opposition to centralization in numerous
passionate letters to editors as well as in regular correspondence with high-placed Indian
Affairs Branch officials in Ottawa. Although he was at times immodest, styling himself
a leader of the “Indians,” Tappan Adney was also quick to point out that the Maliseet
themselves were spearheading the anti-centralization campaign. When, for example, an
Indian Affairs Branch official asked Tappan Adney to encourage the Maliseet to
willingly relocate to Kingsclear, Tappan Adney replied: “I feel myself powerless to
influence the Indians concerned in this matter.”47 Members of the Maliseet
communities, drawing on the basic literacy afforded them by their past attendance at
federal Indian schools, also wrote letters to the editor of regional newspapers – some
published as far afield as Prince Edward Island.48
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While Tappan Adney was perhaps the most vocal champion of the Maliseet anti-
centralization cause, the Maliseet also solicited support from other non-Natives, clearly
targeting individuals with political influence and obtaining some success in this regard.
One of these individuals was solicitor Herbert H. Gunter. In October 1946 Oromocto
Chief John S. Paul visited Gunter, expressing his opposition to centralization and
requesting that Gunter “take this matter up and see what could be done to ensure their
remaining at their present location, and also what Government help they might expect.”
Paul’s choice of ally was a good one; Gunter had connections in high places. The day
after Paul’s visit, Gunter wrote a letter outlining the chief’s concerns about centralization
to his friend and law partner and federal Minister of Fisheries H.F. Bridges.49 Bridges, at
the time the senior New Brunswicker in the cabinet of Liberal Prime Minister William
Lyon MacKenzie King, took an interest in the matter. He forwarded Paul’s concerns to
J.A. Glen, the minister of the Department of Mines and Resources (the home department
of the IAB) and requested information about the planned Kingsclear centralization.50
A second tactic employed by the Maliseet was to convey their concerns about the
proposed centralization plan directly to the IAB. The plan to centralize the Maliseet of
the lower Saint John River happened at a time of unprecedented (if imperfect) federal
willingness to directly consider Native people’s concerns about themselves and their
communities. Prior to the 1940s, Ottawa had been loathe to entertain direct
correspondence from Native people, and federal officials commonly scolded Native
people for circumventing their local agent by writing to the department. In the post-war
era Ottawa relaxed this stricture as it reformed the Indian Act, and this change in policy
was precipitated by a number of forces. By the mid-1940s the Indian Affairs Branch
and its policies were facing public criticisms, which, though not themselves new, found
added resonance in post-war Canada. Nazi atrocities in Europe awakened Canadians to
the injustices suffered by Native people in their own backyard and perpetuated by the
Indian Act. The 1948 passage of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
reaffirmed public resolve to reform the Indian Act, which was increasingly viewed as
insular, out-dated, and heavy-handed.51 At the same time, there emerged in the
corridors of Parliament a new will to reform government policy in keeping with new
social science theory; this, too, encouraged a rethinking of Canadian Indian policy.52 In
response to the dual forces of public criticism and a governmental will to change, in
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May 1946 Prime Minister Mackenzie King appointed a 26-member Special Joint
Committee of the House of Commons and the Senate to reform Canadian Indian
policy.53 For three years, the Special Joint Committee heard evidence from parties
involved in Indian Affairs such as IAB officials, church leaders, and social scientists.
The committee did its work in three venues – at Ottawa-based hearings held from
1946-48, through written submissions from Native people and other interested parties,
and, most significantly for the Maliseet, via a traveling Royal Commission deployed to
eastern Canada in the autumn of 1946.
The Special Joint Committee’s work, including its traveling Royal Commission,
was soundly criticized by Native people and, later on, academics for failing to heed the
Aboriginal input it solicited.54 The Maliseet were certainly well aware of flaws in the
committee’s consultative agenda. For all intents and purposes, the Ottawa-based
hearings were inaccessible to the Maliseet. Reacting to the fact that no Maliseet
representatives were invited to formally appear before the committee’s hearings,
Tappan Adney complained to the commission that “the Indians of the Maritimes have
not been properly heard from.”55 The Maliseet were also not asked to submit formal,
written briefs to the committee; of the 134 official briefs written by Native groups and
appended to Special Joint Committee minutes only three were from Maritime
communities, and none of these were Maliseet.56 Outraged, Tappan Adney complained
that the Maliseet had “not been given a fair hearing.”57 Not invited to Ottawa and
discouraged from submitting written briefs, the sole official mechanism by which the
Maliseet could make their concerns known to the Special Joint Committee was through
the Royal Commission that toured eastern Canada in late 1946.58
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The Royal Commission was closely affiliated with the Special Joint Committee.
All of the commissioners were committee members and the mandate of the
commission was precisely that of the committee proper.59 Styled as a “fact finding”
body for the Special Joint Committee, the Royal Commission held 18 days of hearings
and heard from 170 witnesses across eastern Canada.60 The commission was,
however, a far-from-perfect means of documenting Maliseet concerns about their
communities and Indian administration in Canada. The fact that it traveled quickly
and paused only briefly at specially selected stops offended the Maliseet.61 Indeed,
when Chief William Saulis of the Tobique reserve addressed the commissioners on 1
November 1946, he reminded them that in order to give full hearing to the concerns
of his community much more time should have been allotted for their visit. He
explained “I have many witnesses to be heard. But as you do not have the time to hear
them, you will have to believe me when I speak for them.” In addition, the committee
did not mitigate cultural barriers such as language. This also impeded full disclosure
and annoyed the Maliseet. Chief Saulis voiced his displeasure at the fact-finding
process, arguing that he would have been better able to present his case in his own
language: “Gentlemen, we cannot write out what we have to say. I am speaking your
language, not my own. I could say much better what I have to say in my own
language.”62 Tappan Adney recognized Maliseet dissatisfaction with the commission
and informed committee member J.D. MacNichol that, given these flaws, the Maliseet
had little confidence in the commission’s work.63
Although it was imperfect, the Royal Commission was nevertheless the only
opportunity the Maliseet had to directly influence the Special Joint Committee’s
work. Moreover, in light of the geographic distance that existed between the Maliseet
in the Saint John River Valley and Ottawa, the Royal Commission was significant in
that it gave the Maliseet a voice before important federal officials. The Maliseet
recognized in the Royal Commission an unprecedented opportunity to raise their most
pressing concerns, in person, to a federal body that just might listen; when it visited
the Maliseet reserves on 30 October and 1 November, 1946, they seized the
opportunity to air their grievances.64 None were more important than federal plans to
centralize them at Kingsclear.
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The third way in which the Maliseet opposed centralization was through an anti-
centralization campaign organized within their communities using a reconstituted
political alliance they called the Wulastukw Tribe. Beginning in the early winter of
1947, the Maliseet undertook to revive a dormant political structure – a union of the
“St. John River Tribe of Indians.” According to Tappan Adney, the Maliseet had
decided upon a “reconstitution of the old Walastukw or St. John River Tribe of
Indians consisting of a central council of representatives from the Chiefs of present
reserves until special representatives are chosen by the reservations who will elect a
chief or chairman . . . to deal with tribal affairs internally.”65
The timing of the emergence of this political organization is significant. It followed
shortly after the 1944 inauguration of the North American Indian Brotherhood
(NAIB), a national organization headed by British Columbian Andrew Paull.66
Although the NAIB has long been characterized as a western movement, Maritime
Native people were involved shortly after its founding. In August 1945, 200 Mi’kmaq
from across the Maritimes met at Big Cove, New Brunswick, “to organize Indian
leaders to amalgamate with the North American Indian Brotherhood.” The Big Cove
gathering endorsed the NAIB’s 21-point programme as well as working to “cover and
remedy the ill treatment administered to Indians by government Agents especially in
the Maritimes” and establishing the framework for a Maritime branch of the NAIB,
which became the United General Indian Council of Nova Scotia (UGICNS) with Ben
Christmas of Eskasoni as its first president.67 It is not clear that the Maliseet were
directly affiliated with the NAIB or involved with the UGICNS (which, despite its
name, drew members from New Brunswick Mi’kmaw communities). However, as
they observed the UGICNS fight centralization in Nova Scotia, the Maliseet no doubt
recognized the potential of political mobilization in countering a similar federal plan
in New Brunswick.68
Specifically, the Wulastukw tribe was a response to Ottawa’s control over
community governance. Since 1899 the Maliseet, like all Native people living east of
Quebec, had been federally mandated to elect chiefs and councillors according to a
three-year system of election known as the triennial system – a system of community
governance that gave considerable control to IAB officials in Ottawa and in the
field.69 Tappan Adney explained that the Wulastkw Tribe was designed to “break up
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the band government” as imposed by the triennial system and to compel the federal
government to “deal with the tribes, not the bands and individuals by which Indian
Affairs has destroyed tribal unity.”70 Also at issue in the creation of the new political
unit, however, was the extent to which Ottawa attempted to more generally control
Maliseet communities through what Adney called “a very old rule of despots and
dictators.”71 There was probably no more apt example of Ottawa asserting too much
authority in Maliseet affairs than the attempt to force centralization.
The varied ways in which the Maliseet contested the proposed Kingsclear scheme
suggests the depth of the opposition that existed in Maliseet communities to the
centralization plan. Using these various means, the Maliseet voiced a convincing
array of reasons as to why the Kingsclear centralization plan should be scuttled. One
important source of dissatisfaction with the relocation plan was the fact that the move
would threaten some important economic opportunities enjoyed by the Maliseet in
their current communities. Woodstock, Devon (St. Mary’s), and Oromocto were
adjacent to non-Native communities in which many Maliseet had jobs and other
opportunities, such as ready markets for their handcrafts. Indeed, Ottawa’s own
records bore out the importance of the work that Native people in New Brunswick
secured off-reserve. According to these records, wage labour was the single greatest
source of income for New Brunswick’s Native people in 1945. That year New
Brunswick Native people earned $72,800, or 63 per cent of their total earnings of
$115,470, through waged work. Given the dearth of on-reserve employment
opportunities, these wages would primarily have been earned off-reserve.72 Agency
reports suggest that, like New Brunswickers generally, many Native wage earners
worked in lumber camps and sawmills. They also traveled to Maine in the late
summer and autumn to help harvest blueberries and potatoes.73 Second in importance
only to wage labour, IAB records attribute $26,700, or nearly a quarter of New
Brunswick Native people’s annual wages, to a category called “other.” Although
undefined, “other” probably included money earned from guiding and the production
and sale of handcrafts as neither of these undertakings appears in income-generating
activities despite their reputed importance and frequent mention throughout agents’
annual reports. The sale of farm goods, fish, and the spoils of hunting and trapping
accounted for additional 3.8, 3.8, and 2.7 per cent of incomes respectively.74 Although
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employment opportunities clearly took New Brunswick’s Native people off reserves
– a fact reflected in branch records – this consideration was ignored by the IAB in
formulating the Kingsclear scheme.
It was, therefore, not surprising that in a petition to the Special Joint Committee,
the Maliseet at Devon “entered strong protest against the removal plan on the ground
that their jobs were at Fredericton and vicinity and the Kingsclear place was too far
away from their jobs.”75 As Tappan Adney relayed to Ottawa, the Maliseet’s present
communities were “convenient for the Indians who have local jobs.”76 Tappan Adney
re-iterated this point in a letter to the editor of Woodstock’s Sentinel Press in which
he charged that “Kingsclear is miles away from the natural markets of the Indians here
at Devon who are to be removed.”77 A month later, that same paper printed a similar
argument from Oromocto Chief John S. Paul, who stated that “the work we are doing
now and what we can pick up around in Oromocto is very important to us.”78 Paul
recognized that his people were “well-known in the community [of Oromocto] and
able to obtain work in that vicinity without any trouble, and that they are also well
thought of in that locality.” He feared that were “they moved to Kingsclear it would
be more difficult to obtain outside work due to the numbers who would be living
there” and, as he told solicitor H.H. Gunter, “there are better facilities for securing
employment in the Oromocto district than there would be in the vicinity of Kingsclear
or elsewhere.”79
The Maliseet also had strong emotional and family connections to the communities
in which they had lived for many years and were, for this reason, reluctant to leave.
As the inhabitants of the Woodstock reserve made clear, they had lived “many
generations” at their present location and did not want to move.80 The same was true
of the Oromocto reserve. In making his case against centralization to solicitor Gunter,
Chief Paul explained that his community’s opposition was vested, in part, in the fact
that they had lived at Oromocto “for some 57 years.”81
Despite their fondness for their communities, the inhabitants of St. Mary’s,
Woodstock, and Oromocto did not harbour utopian visions of their situations. They
recognized that housing conditions and unemployment, in particular, were problems,
but they did not see relocation as the solution. At Oromocto, Chief Paul was well
aware of the poor living conditions on his reserve, but he believed that improving the
community, not abandoning it, was the best solution. In his complaint to H.H. Gunter,
Chief Paul noted that their homes were “in a bad state of repair” and the community
was in dire need of a water system. Paul also made clear the fact that the residents of
the Oromocto reserve “had not been receiving any help financially from the
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Government and are in need of some assistance.”82 In a letter published in
Woodstock’s Sentinel Press, Chief Paul argued that the “grounds and land here in
Oromocto Reserve are just as good as anywhere.” Referring to IAB notions about the
calibre of the houses at Oromocto, he continued that it was “only just because they
[IAB officials] seen lots of shabby shacks they thought the land would be the same.”
He claimed that branch officials were “try[ing to] condemn this Reserve, also
Woodstock” and wondered “Why couldn’t they build houses here on Oromocto
Reserve as well as Kingsclear[?] It would be very pleasing suggestion for Oromocto
Indians.”83
The Maliseet of the Woodstock reserve were also quite aware that (as the IAB
pointed out) their community faced a serious problem in that it was becoming
overcrowded. But for them, the solution rested not in relocation but rather in the
resolution of a long-standing land issue. At issue in Woodstock was a land deal that
had been struck in 1908, when the Indian Affairs Department allowed Coster
Wetmore to purchase 43.75 acres of the Woodstock reserve for a price of $585.50. In
the aftermath of Ottawa’s brief 1897 contemplation of relocating the Woodstock
Maliseet, Wetmore, who was clearly aware of this consideration, offered to buy the
Woodstock reserve that adjoined his own farm. In 1898 he wrote to the DIA,
explaining: “I live alongside of the Indian reserve here and am writing to know if it
could be sold as the Indians or half breeds here are pretty troublesome in different
ways.”84 Informed by the Indian agent that the Maliseet would not want to sell or
relocate, Wetmore’s offer was at that time declined.85
However, the idea of selling Woodstock reserve land persisted. Two years later,
Carleton County Member of Parliament F.B. Carvell raised the issue with Clifford
Sifton, the minister in charge of matters pertaining to Indians. Carvell asked about the
possibility of selling the reserve land, noting that “it is in the midst of a very
flourishing farming community and the farmers on both sides of the Reserve are
naturally anxious not only to get rid of the Indians but to have the land opened for
cultivation.”86 Wetmore himself continued to lobby Ottawa, explaining in a 1900
letter to the department that while he would “very much like to see the Indians
somewhere else,” he would be satisfied with the ability to purchase part of the reserve
and allowing the Maliseet to remain on another section where they “would still have
a chance to live on a good road and . . . would be far enough away to make them much
less of a nuisance.”87 For the next few years, Wetmore persistently made his case that
reserve land should be sold to him. In 1905, MP Carvell reiterated Wetmore’s
proposal and asked for the DIA’s approval.88 At that time the DIA refused the offer.
Three years later, however, amid Wetmore’s and Carvell’s continued lobbying,
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Maliseet Noel Polchies of Woodstock informed Indian Agent Farrell that the “Indians
here have agreed that we may as well sell that piece of land commencing above the
Indians houses . . . as we don’t use it and the money would be of use to us.”89 On 13
March 1908 Farrell presented to the department what he called a land surrender from
the Maliseet. It contained the marks of six signatories and a notation by Farrell that
two members who should have voted on the issue were absent from the community
and had not offered their endorsement.90 Later that spring, after a decade of trying,
Wetmore paid $585.50 for 43.75 acres of land belonging to the Woodstock reserve.91
The Wetmore land issue resurfaced in 1944 when Wetmore’s brother, who was then
in the possession of the land, refused the IAB’s offer to purchase the tract for $1,000 for
return to the reserve.92 Clearly, the IAB recognized that the return of the land would do
much to alleviate the crowded conditions prevailing on the reserve. It is telling that the
IAB’s main rationale for Woodstock’s relocation was its shortage of land. Tappan
Adney articulated the Maliseet’s belief that the IAB was using as its relocation “pretext
. . . [the] lack of building space when there would be plenty [of] space but for a paper . . .
signed in 1908 deeding about 40 acres from the middle of the 150 acre reserve to Coster
Wetmore.”93 The Maliseet, therefore, took issue with a relocation premised on a land
shortage at Woodstock. Moreover, the Maliseet firmly believed that the 1908 land sale
had been illegal in the first place; the federal government, they noted, was not legally
entitled to dispose of reserve land without the full support of a band, and the six
signatories of 1908 – a time when the community had no chief – did not represent a
sufficient level of endorsement. Indeed, just four years after the transaction, the Maliseet
were decrying the sale. In 1912, when Wetmore proposed that he be allowed to purchase
more reserve land the Maliseet not only refused to concede to a further sale but also
“express[ed] themselves as being sorry for the surrendering of the land that was sold
some time ago.” The Indian agent, N.J. Smith, implored Ottawa not to allow a further
sale and noted (with remarkable foreshadowing) that such a sale “will leave them
without a place to get firewood or lumber if they should wish to enlarge their dwellings
or build new ones.”94 While the revocation of the Wetmore land sale promised to right
an unlawful transaction, the Maliseet also saw the restoration of their reserve to its
former size as an action that would negate the federal rationale for centralization.
The Maliseet also opposed relocation to the Kingsclear site in particular and
offered a myriad of reasons as to why it was a poor choice for a settlement. In May
1947, when Tappan Adney was asked by the IAB to assuage Maliseet concerns and
encourage them to relocate, he flatly refused.95 Recognizing Maliseet opposition to
the Kingsclear site chosen by the IAB, Tappan Adney wrote: “That I will not do. The
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place has been condemned by all the Indians, and it would be useless for me to try.”96
What was the source of this condemnation? First, the Maliseet explained that
Kingsclear lacked the heritage of their existing communities and had never been
recognized as a bonafide Maliseet settlement. In a petition to the Special Joint
Committee, likely penned in 1946, Chief Oliver Polchies of Woodstock explained:
Kingsclear used to be called French Village. . . . It was never a place
the Indians picked out for a village. After the Indians at Ekapahak,
the chief town of the Wulastook or St. John River Tribe were
cheated out of Ekapahak and Indian Island where the Indians used
to assemble for conferences, cheated by white man, they moved up
to French Village where some of their old friends the French still
lived. The Indians couldn’t make a living there. Three years ago
there were only three Indian children in the school. Mostly old
people left. The children when they grew up had to go away.97
With strong words Tappan Adney described Kingsclear as a site with “nothing
whatever to recommend it” – largely due to practical impediments.98 The site selected
by the IAB was not on the banks of the Saint John River. Instead it featured “houses
perched at a steep hillside” in “no spot the Indians would have chosen.”99 Like the
fairly new inland reserve site at Devon, Kingsclear lacked access to the Saint John
River and the transportation by canoe and sustenance through fishing that the river
provided the Maliseet. In a letter to Tappan Adney, Chief John S. Paul of Oromocto
made this clear. He wrote that Kingsclear was “unsuitable for man to make his daily
living such as hunting in spring [of] the year also fishing and all such a lot of other
things. What Indian,” he continued, “could make his living” at Kingsclear?100 Paul’s
poor opinion of Kingsclear was seconded by the Woodstock Maliseet, who argued
against the proposed site in their October 1946 meeting with the traveling Royal
Commission as well as in a petition delivered to the Special Joint Committee. In this
petition they stressed the unsuitability of Kingsclear by detailing just how many
Maliseet people had in recent years tried and failed to establish lives there, thwarted
by the site’s distance from markets and lack of river frontage.101
The federal rationale for Kingsclear’s selection was also a source of Maliseet
discontent. According to federal plans, the centralized Kingsclear was to become a
farming community. Centralized families were to be provisioned with “three acres
and a cow” to allow them to make their living, an idea that was soundly chastised by
the Maliseet. Tappan Adney, clearly cognizant of mid-20th-century trends toward
expansive, consolidated farms, proclaimed the federal plan “the craziest idea, that a
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man and family can live on three acres of land, when the trend in farming is larger and
larger tracts that will pay for operation by machinery.” The farming scheme was, he
suggested “an impractical plan even if the Indian wanted to farm.” And this was an
important consideration because the Maliseet made it clear that farming was not their
preference. Maliseet men at Oromocto, St. Mary’s, and Woodstock were primarily
wage-labourers within their communities as well as in the neighbouring non-Native
communities of Woodstock and Fredericton. As one Maliseet woman matter-of-factly
explained to Tappan Adney: “If we wanted to farm we would have farmed long
ago.”102 Tappan Adney succinctly summed up this opinion: “Why in hell must they
keep on trying to make an Indian here into a farmer, and how in hell can anybody farm
on three acres, and who in hell wants the stink of goats?”103 Despite generations of
failed initiatives elsewhere, farming was the main “benefit” trumpeted by the IAB in
reference to the Kingsclear site.
Also offensive to the Maliseet was the fact that the Kinsgclear relocation plan, like
the centralization scheme in Nova Scotia, was linked to another federal policy – the
resettlement of returned Maliseet veterans.104 A number of Maliseets from the Saint
John River Valley had served in the Second World War. Tappan Adney compiled a
list of 98 Maliseet enlistees, including 21 from Devon, 12 from Oromocto, 7 from
Kingsclear, 14 from Woodstock, and 44 from Tobique.105 On their return from war,
the veterans expected to be provided a tract of land as was their right. For the Maliseet
of the Saint John River Valley, however, the IAB made the veteran resettlement plan
contingent upon relocation. The case of Woodstock chief and Second World War
veteran Oliver Polchies stands as one example. After having served overseas for five
years, Polchies returned to Woodstock believing that “he should receive
reestablishment assistance on the same footing as a white veteran” in accordance with
the Veterans Land Act. Rather than being allotted land on his own reserve at
Woodstock, however, Polchies was informed that he would have to relocate to the
centralized Kingsclear site to receive an allotment.106 Polchies was not alone. Three
other veterans, all from Oromocto, were likewise informed that any land they might
receive would have to be at Kingsclear.107
Other dubious tactics used by the Indian Affairs Branch to induce the Maliseet to
move also served to deepen Maliseet discontent. They resented that they had not been
consulted before the IAB purchased the Murray property at Kingsclear, a purchase
that flew in the face of the Special Joint Committee’s alleged commitment to
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consultation. Indeed, Tappan Adney believed that “the one great defect in this plan
was that the Indians were not consulted as to its feasibility.”108 More significantly,
though, the Maliseet opposed the coercion that was part of federal centralization
policy – coercion that was felt in a number of ways.109 In Woodstock, Chief Polchies,
when faced with the request to relocate, was reluctant to make a snap decision. He
was, however, pressured by IAB officials to do so. Polchies explained to Tappan
Adney that when federal officials asked his consent to have his community moved, he
told them “he desired to consult members of the Band first, but was told they hadn’t
time. Then he told them he wanted first to consult a person at Woodstock by phone,
by the name being given ‘adney’; but they hadn’t time to wait.”110 The Maliseet were
also pressured to move by federal threats; if they did not move, their own
communities would lose IAB services. Chief John Paul of Oromocto, for example,
testified in a sworn statement that Agent Edward Whalen and another IAB official had
“discussed with me the subject of removals to Kingsclear and told me that if the
Oromocto Indians refused to remove to Kingsclear and choose to remain on their
reserve, they will be considered by the government no longer entitled to the
allowances and services that we have been receiving as Indians. That we will be white
people and will have to pay taxes.”111 In addition to these overt forms of coercion, the
chief at Woodstock alleged that his community was being subjected to more subtle
methods. In his submission to the Special Joint Commission, Polchies alleged that the
IAB was trying to coerce the Maliseet at Woodstock to relocate by reneging on
promised community improvement plans. Polchies wrote:
Since last fall the Indian Agent has failed the government’s promise
to make improvements much needed. After building a house for a
veteran and starting to renovate the house of another veteran, work
stopped. Mrs. Minnie Paul, wife of Peter Paul, Indian constable was
promised a small addition to her house right away. This stopped.
Outdoor privies are in disgraceful condition. Every year the
government has plowed a garden site on a low bench of the River
and given us seed for planting. This year the government would not
plow and told us we have to look after the gardening ourselves. We
are told there is no chance to put cellars under our houses. . . . We
think the government was intending to move us all down to
Kingsclear, that is why they stopped work last fall.112
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The Maliseet at Woodstock, he felt, were being bullied into moving to Kingsclear.
Publicly the IAB denied these charges, claiming that any relocation would be
strictly voluntary. For example, when Tappan Adney alleged to IAB Director R.A.
Hoey that branch officials were using coercive and threatening tactics to force
relocation, a memo from the Office of the Superintendent of Reserves and Trustees
responded that “it is the intention that centralization would be on a purely voluntary
basis and that it was not the intention to compel any family to move to Kingsclear
against their wishes.”113 However, the attitude evinced by branch officials, including
Hoey himself, lends considerable credence to the Maliseet allegations. When, in the
fall of 1946, New Brunswick cabinet minister H.F. Bridges became involved in the
controversial plan at Maliseet request, the response he got from the IAB seemed to
confirm Maliseet fears that the IAB was committed to relocation even in the face of
concerted Maiseet opposition. Responding to charges passed by Bridges to the IAB
concerning the alleged coercion, the Minister of the Interior W.J.F. Pratt wrote:
It is noted that the Chief of the Oromocto Reserve is perturbed over
the possibility that the Oromocto Indians may be moved to the
Kingsclear Reserve and I can give no assurance that such a move
will not be carried out in the future. The Indian Affairs Branch have
under consideration a centralization programme for the Indians of
the Saint John River valley and although no definite decision has
been reached as to the inclusion of the Oromocto Indians it has been
recommended that they be included and moved to Kingsclear next
year and that decent houses be constructed for them on the new
Reserve.
The minister then discounted the scope of Maliseet opposition: “It is only to be
expected that some of the older Indians will oppose any proposal to move them from
land on which they have lived all their lives, even though the move, if it takes place,
cannot but improve their living conditions.” He went on to further justify the
relocation, explaining that “any proposal of this kind must be considered from the
point of view of future generations of the Band, as well as present members.” If the
Oromocto Maliseet were moved, he stated, “such decision will be made on the
grounds that the move will be of definite benefit to the Band as a whole.”114
In another instance, a charge levelled by Tappan Adney accusing Agency Inspector
J.E. Morris of bullying the Maliseet met a response that likewise confirmed Maliseet
allegations that the branch had a clear intent to move them regardless of the level of
dissent. Morris opened his letter to Tappan Adney “emphatically deny[ing] that the
Indians in any way were threatened to persuade them to move to the Kingsclear
area.”115 However, as his letter continued, Morris demonstrated his and the IAB’s
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unwillingness to support any Maliseet who chose not to “voluntarily” relocate.
Seemingly unable to recognize the contradiction between his concept of the
“voluntary” nature of the plan and the assertion that the IAB would not support
reserves that elected not to move to Kingsclear, Morris maintained that
the Indians at Oromocto and Woodstock were informed that there
was a building program being undertaken to assist them in
establishing themselves in decent, well-constructed houses with
cement basements, thorough brick chimneys from the basement up
and that I would not recommend the expenditure of public funds to
make extensive repairs, putting in basements for houses at the
Woodstock Reserve which is already overcrowded and would,
undoubtedly, if a fire started in any one of them, completely wipe
out the whole settlement if the wind happened to be high or in the
right direction. Regarding Oromocto Reserve, the area does not
lend itself to digging out cellars as the subsoil is slatey and rocky.
Further at this reserve and it also applies to the Woodstock Reserve
they have not sufficient acres of arable land in which to raise
vegetables, fruits etc., nor have they pasture to keep a cow and other
livestock. The intention of building new houses is to establish them
on an area where they will have plenty of good land available for
gardening, where there is pasture and water available as well as
sufficient land to raise fodder for winter feeding. This office is very
concerned about the present unsanitary conditions of the houses at
these Reserves. We are undertaking, at considerable cost to the tax-
payers, to assist these Indians and it is important for the success of
the scheme that the Indians give us their full co-operation.116
Tappan Adney noted, referring to an exchange he had had with Hoey himself over
federal plans to compel the Maliseet at Oromocto to move, that “Hoey indicated no
intention of changing his mind nor remedying the complaints of Oromocto
Indians.”117
Maliseet concerns about federal centralization tactics were not eased by the
experiences of the few Maliseet who did agree to test the waters at Kingsclear. In the
spring of 1947, a few members of the Oromocto reserve made the move upriver to the
Kingsclear site. Things did not go well at the new community. In a letter to Chief
William Saulis of Tobique, Oromocto’s Chief Paul complained about how they had
been treated following their relocation: “We were told last spring that if we move to
Kingsclear Reserve we’d be looked after. But things turn out just the opposite way.”
Promised farm stock failed to materialize, and the homes constructed were cold and
drafty. As a result, all of the families who moved to Kingsclear soon wanted to return
to Oromocto, but some were unable to do so. Three Oromocto families, according to
Paul, were “stuck” at Kingsclear because branch officials had dismantled their
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Oromocto homes while they were away. Paul also suggested that the Oromocto
community was being “punished” with the closure of its school and the cutting of
relief. Aghast at their treatment, Chief Paul remarked: “I don’t believe Indians ever
experience[d] anything like this before.”118
Despite the fact that a few families tried their luck at Kingsclear, it never became
the centralized home of the Saint John River Maliseet as per Ottawa’s plan. As in
Nova Scotia, there is no one defining moment marking the end of the centralization
plan in New Brunswick.119 By 1949, however, talk of Maliseet centralization had
waned. In 1950, the names of the province’s Indian agencies were changed to reflect
Ottawa’s interest in establishing Kingsclear as a place of prominence in Indian
administration, but the Maliseet did not move there en masse nor did it become the
hub of Indian affairs administration.120
Factors external to the Maliseet community doubtless contributed to the plan’s
abandonment. Lisa Patterson suggests that changes in the upper echelons of the
federal government in 1948 created an administration less committed to
centralization. That year, Louis St. Laurent replaced Prime Minister King as Liberal
leader, J.A. MacKinnon was named head of the Department of Mines and Resources,
and Major D.M. Mackay replaced centralization’s great supporter, R.A. Hoey, as
director of the IAB. Patterson notes that federal correspondence after this date
reflected a move away from the advocacy of total centralization in Nova Scotia. That
Nova Scotia centralization limped on past this date, she argues, was the result of the
fact that so much of that program’s infrastructure was already in place.121 In New
Brunswick, however, centralization had not progressed as far, and so perhaps with this
changing of the guard it was more easily halted. The New Brunswick plan was also
undermined by the fact that by the end of the 1940s the ambitious Nova Scotia scheme
was recognized as a failure – not just by the Mi’kmaq who had long been decrying it,
but also by branch officials. The centralized reserves of Shubenacadie and Eskasoni
were overcrowded and isolated from sites of waged labour (just as Kingsclear was for
the Maliseet) and, as a result, their residents were unable to find work. Federal
officials were also disillusioned by the fact that centralization did not reduce branch
spending. Much to the dismay of officials at the IAB, relief costs did not fall but
instead increased.122
The scuttling of the New Brunswick plan may also have been connected to the fact
that the IAB found itself preoccupied with the pressing task of drafting the long-
awaited Indian Act revision, the end result of the Special Joint Committee and its
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eastern Royal Commission.123 Between 1948, the year the Royal Commission
completed its work, and 1951, the year the new Indian Act was passed, the future of
Canada’s Indian policy remained unclear. In the interim, IAB officials were probably
little interested in committing time and energy to a new centralization program,
particularly in light of the less-than-satisfactory results in Nova Scotia.
Credit for the scuttled Kingsclear plan, however, must also be attributed to the
Maliseet.124 Their anti-centralization campaign had the desired result of swaying both
public and federal opinion. First, it is clear that the Maliseet’s publicity campaign paid
off; it won for them not only the support of well-placed advocates such as Edwin
Tappan Adney and federal cabinet member H.F. Bridges, but also the support of many
non-Natives in the province as well. The success of this public campaign was
demonstrated by an April 1947 editorial appearing in the Woodstock Sentinel Press.
Commenting on letters the paper had received from both Tappan Adney and
Oromocto’s Chief Paul, the newspaper’s editors publicly backed the Maliseet in their
opposition to centralization. The editors wrote that they were compelled “to add our
voice to that of Mr. Adney’s in protest against the move.” The editorial continued:
“The Indians are undoubtedly wards of the Government but that they should be moved
to a region which they consider less advantageous than their present site without their
full consent, seems to us an unreasonable viewpoint on the part of the Department.
After all we all have a certain responsibility toward the Indians. Let’s make sure that
in carrying out this responsibility we take some consideration of the Indians’ feelings
in the matter.”125 Tappan Adney himself certainly believed that the public opinion was
being swayed by the Maliseet campaign against centralization. In a letter to IAB
Director R.A. Hoey, Tappan Adney stated that “as publicity is giving to these
proceedings, the people at large are becoming aroused, their sympathy with the
Indians denied even human rights.”126 The power of public opinion helped dissuade
Ottawa from proceeding with its plan.
The Maliseet also succeeded in their bid to make officials in Ottawa aware of their
opposition to centralization. First, they drew on the political strength of their newly
reconstituted Wulastook Tribe to make their case against centralization in an
impromptu meeting before several members of the Special Joint Committee in
Ottawa. In July 1947 Chief William Saulis of Tobique, a key player in this re-formed
political organization, funded his own trip to Ottawa, where he met with members of
the Special Joint Committee and introduced them to the new political structure. Saulis
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had in hand a letter that was signed by all of the other members of the new political
body – a tactic he thought would be valuable as the joint effort in writing “in one
body” would “pack a final punch.”127
It was, however, in their representations before the traveling Royal Commission
that the Maliseet made their strongest case against centralization before federal
officials. The anti-centralization messages they conveyed to the commission clearly
deflated federal enthusiasm for the Kingsclear plan. At each brief stop it made, the
Royal Commission faced a volley of anti-centralization arguments from the Maliseet:
they depended on the economic opportunities of their home reserves and were
committed to their towns’ heritage and connections to family, past, and present; they
adamantly opposed the coercive tactics of the IAB; and they believed that a settlement
at Kingsclear, which was centred on small-scale farming, was doomed to fail as
indeed initial efforts there suggested. Tappan Adney was impressed with the force of
Maliseet representations before the commission and he believed that the
commissioners were moved by them. Of Chief William Saulis’s testimony before the
commission, he wrote (with characteristic melodrama) that after the chief spoke
“there was a silence from the Committee. They were profoundly impressed by the
dignity and earnestness of the unlettered savage. At length the Committee said that
they would accept his spoken word for fact.”128
The traveling Royal Commission also relayed Maliseet concerns to the Special
Joint Committee sitting in Ottawa. Committee member and commission member D.S.
Harkness assured Tappan Adney that the members of the Royal Commission had
brought the centralization issue before the Special Joint Committee proper where the
offensive aspects of the policy were challenged: “The matter of the removal of Indians
from their various Reserves along the Saint John River was raised in the meeting of
the Committee, held yesterday, by Mr. John MacNichol. I also took up the question
and protested against the compulsion which in my opinion has been put on these
Indians, particularly the veterans, to move to Kingsclear. I trust that as a result of the
representations made the Department will be more careful in the methods they use to
persuade the Indians to concentrate at the Kingsclear Reserve.”129
For his part, Tappan Adney, in a letter to an editor, remarked that “government
cannot be unaware of the unanimous wishes of the Indians and at the same time allow
this new policy of its Indian department to go right on into execution.”130 It seems he
was right. Officials in Ottawa did not merely hear the Maliseet position on
centralization – they were convinced by it. In Ottawa, Special Joint Committee
member John R. MacNichol took up Maliseet concerns about the alleged coercion that
was part of the centralization plan, compelling IAB Director Hoey to declare that
there is no governmental authority for the department “to ask any body of Indians to
remove from their present reserves.”131 Commissioners who traveled to the east were
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particularly convinced of the soundness of the Maliseet anti-centralization
representations. In a radio address that was printed in the Hartland Observer, Special
Joint Committee and Royal Commission member W. Garfield Case dismissed the
viability of a centralization scheme, noting that “its apparent weakness is the idea of
taking these Indians back into the hinterland so to speak, whereas we have already
commented on the fact that they are making their greatest progress near the white
settlements.” Tappan Adney recognized the importance of this statement and, in the
margins beside his newspaper clipping of the article, he wrote, prophetically, “This
cooks the goose of the Kingsclear blunder.”132
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